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Abstract
In theory, an ADSL router can provide an additional layer of security to a wired
and wireless network through; access control, wireless encryption, firewall rule
sets, and network event logging. An ADSL router may also contain the users’
usage habits and broadband account credentials. However, end-users may be
unaware of the intricacies of the security measures available and the potentially
confidential information stored on their device. As a result a second hand ADSL
router may contain a wealth of user-specific information if not wiped and
disposed of in a secure manner.
This paper shows the data that was acquired from a selection of second hand
ADSL routers purchased during the first quarter of 2011. From the data acquired
and analysed, individuals are not removing their personally identifiable
information and are leaving confidential data which may lead to detrimental
outcomes if misused. The paper also shows that end-user applied security on these
devices was alarmingly low. Thus many consumers may fall victim to new and
emergent Internet based crimes if the full security capabilities of their ADSL
router are not applied.
Keywords: ADSL router forensics, broadband router, data recovery, remnant
data
1. INTRODUCTION
As of December, 2010 the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2010) reported
that there are over ten million active Internet connections in Australia. The ABS
figures state that over nine million of these connections are non-dialup (ABS,
2010). The number of active broadband connections will gradually increase with
the implementation of an Australian Government initiative the National
Broadband Network – replacing existing copper communication lines with fibre
optics. This is set to provide consumers and businesses with high-speed
broadband access to ninety-three percent of Australia’s population (Australian
Government, 2011).
ADSL router manufactures and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) sell the ADSL
routers preconfigured thus eliminating the tedious and confusing configuration
process faced by novice users. This allows consumers to connect to the Internet in
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a streamlined (“hassle-free setup”) manner (Westnet, 2011). ADSL routers have
two sets of authentication credentials. The first set of credentials includes the
username and password used to access the broadband service provided by the
ISP. The second set of credentials is utilized to access and configure the ADSL
router. Australian ISPs may dispatch or professionally install ADSL routers and
configure the ADSL router on behalf of the customer (Bigpond, 2011). Vendors
on the other hand populate network or modulation settings in a manner which
allows the device to be used directly out of the box. For instance, this may include
enabling the wireless access point without any security such as Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), or setting the most common
modulation settings for the region of use. Collectively this is eliminating the
difficulties faced by novice computer users to access their network and the
Internet. Consequently, if end-users are not exposed to the product literature or
never configure the ADSL router themselves, then they may be unaware of its
functionality and the specific personal and confidential data stored persistently on
the device. This assumption is reinforced through a 2009 survey (Szewczyk &
Furnell, 2009), whereby a respondent purchased a non-wireless based ADSL
router as they were unaware that the wireless feature could be switched off.
A large focus of current research is centred around remanent data on hard disks,
USB drives and gaming consoles sold through second hand auction websites
(Jones, Valli, & Dabibi, 2009; Valli & Woodward, 2008; Xynos, Harries,
Sutherland, Davies, & Blyth, 2010). This previous research has identified a
continuous trend in sellers leaving confidential data on the devices intact. In a few
rare occurrences sellers format the storage media, but do not use an appropriate
method by which to wipe or destroy the data permanently (Jones, et al., 2009).
An ADSL router when compared to a modern computer system contains limited
volatile and non-volatile storage. Any specific user activities such as browsing
habits are stored in the volatile Random Access Memory (RAM). The device is
disconnected from the wall power outlet during the sale process and as a result
volatile data is lost and cannot be retrieved at a later date. However, the ADSL
router’s non-volatile storage contains account authentication credentials, preconfigured data for accessing remote network services and security settings. In
addition had the device been compromised through malware specimens inclusive
of psyb0t or the Chuck Norris Botnet (Bridges, 2008; Symantec, 2009) this would
result in static changes to the configuration data which will remain present in nonvolatile storage when the device is powered down (Čeleda, Krejčí, Vykopal, &
Drašar, 2010).
The discipline of ADSL router forensics and data acquisition from these devices
still remains in its infancy. Unlike a hard disk or a USB storage device, there is
limited storage space available to store confidential information. In most instances
the persistent storage capacity of an ADSL router will range from 1-8MiB.
However, this is not to say that interest in the area is not growing. Recently the
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United States National Institute of Justice developed the first commercial ADSL
router forensics software namely Router Marshal (ATC-NY, 2010). Router
Marshal whilst mimicking the author’s procedures and methods used in this
paper, is only available to a subset of law enforcement agencies in the United
States of America upon a special request.
2. ADSL ROUTER INVESTIGATION
To gain a perspective of the level of sensitive information, and the security state
of the second hand devices, a series of questions were formulated. The first
question "Do second hand ADSL routers contain user specific information?" was
centred on discovering whether or not an end-user would sell a device with userspecific information intact. No incentives or explanations detailing how or why to
remove personal information currently exist. As a result it is expected that the
devices will contain confidential data overlooked by the seller prior to shipping.
The second question "Are second hand ADSL routers utilizing a recent firmware
image?" is based on the prevalent threat of end-users not updating their firmware.
This may result in the device being susceptible to emergent malware specimens
which exploit the vulnerabilities of the operating system (Baume, 2009; Čeleda, et
al., 2010). End-users may continue utilizing the default firmware on the ADSL
router that was present when the device was purchased. Alternatively, an end-user
who is aware of the reason for updating the firmware and understands the
procedure may then update the firmware.
Implementing effective security controls and safeguards onto a workstation is a
complicated task for many individuals due to the usability constraints of security
software (Ibrahim, Furnell, Papadaki, & Clarke, 2010). An ADSL router has the
capability of providing various layers of defence. Specifically, the device can
incorporate numerous wireless encryption protocols, denial of service prevention
through firewall rule sets, and network logging for review or analysis of network
events. In addition, the device can be configured to filter traffic according to
internal or external IP addresses and ports, or specific Uniform Resource Locators
(URLs). As a result the third question "To what extent is the ADSL router
secured?" is aimed at identifying what security approaches end-users utilize on
their device.
The author’s research to date, has predominantly focused on the development of a
sound approach into acquiring data of interest from Australian based ADSL
routers (Szewczyk, 2009a, 2009b). Subsequently, this same approach and
specifically the SSH and Serial Console methods were utilized in this experiment.
As each device was purchased and received, it was then disassembled to view and
determine which connection point would be utilized to acquire data. The
connection point deemed appropriate was chosen based upon accessibility and the
feasibility of soldering on a pin header without unnecessarily damaging the
device. The appropriate cable (Szewczyk, 2009b) was subsequently attached to
each ADSL router and a series of command line arguments and software were
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initiated to begin the transfer of data to a host workstation. The subsequent images
which were extracted from each device were carved using a hexadecimal editor as
per the method demonstrated by Szewczyk (2009a). The resultant ADSL router
image is viewed via an XML style sheet for simple data interpretation.
Each device was purchased from the second hand auction site - eBay Australia.
For the purpose of this research a second hand ADSL router constitutes a device
in which the seller on eBay claims that it has been used previously. This was
undertaken by narrowing down eBay results according to the condition category
of either used or refurbished. The selection of ADSL routers was biased in that
purchases were made over a thirty day period (January through to February, 2011)
and limited to the home or small business array of devices. This approach was
selected in that a subsequent study would be undertaken on the high-end range of
ADSL routers which contained server and multimedia capabilities at a later date.
An initial outcome of the study was the lack of ADSL routers available on the
second hand auction site eBay. The price of many ADSL routers has decreased
over the years and consumers are now able to purchase devices with newer and
advanced features such as the inclusion of 802.11n Wi-Fi or an inbuilt media
server (D-Link, 2011). As a result there appears to be little incentive for an
individual to purchase a second hand device which could be deterring sellers from
auctioning their used device on eBay. Over the thirty day period it was evident
that D-Link and Netgear were the predominant ADSL routers available. This
could be influenced by many Australian retail outlets predominantly selling these
brands. At the conclusion of the purchasing period, a total of twenty-three devices
were obtained from the manufactures; D-Link, Netgear, and 2Wire (which is sold
by Australia’s ISP – Bigpond. Table 1 in the discussion section lists the make and
model of the devices purchased.
3. RESEARCH RESULTS
The following data presents the findings for the study of twenty-three ADSL
routers obtained from second hand auction site. Data could be successfully
acquired from twenty-two devices corresponding to a ninety-six percent success
rate. One ADSL router was damaged. This was known to the researcher upon the
time of sale. However, an attempt to recover data was still made although
unsuccessful. After a careful examination it appeared that the device had suffered
an electrical shock resulting in various capacitors and memory chips being
damaged.
Two of the twenty-three devices had been reset to their factory default state
(presumably by the seller) resulting in no individual data being available to
extract and analyse. Factory resetting the device can be achieved by loading the
default vendor configuration values via a script obtainable through the vendor
website. Alternatively, the user may physically reset the device by the switch
located at the back of the device. This results in the configuration partition of nonvolatile flash memory being overwritten with the vendor default values – located
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in a separate flash partition (OpenWRT, 2010).
Three of the ADSL routers had partial data removed. In this instance the
broadband authentication credentials consisting of the username and password
could not be located. Upon investigation it appeared that the seller or previous
owner may have manually deleted the data, and permanently committed the
changes to non-volatile storage.
Fifteen of the ADSL routers had all their data intact. In these specific instances
broadband authentication credentials and resultant passwords were still present. In
addition, nine of these fifteen devices (sixty percent) incorporated a wireless
access point, in which all wireless related information was present.
Two of the ADSL routers were non acquirable due to access point constraints. In
this instance the D-Link DSL-200 device does not encompass on chip access
points to acquire data from the device. An invasive HTTP approach was utilized,
although the devices had been password protected. The process of factory
resetting the device was used which permitted the default username and password
to be used, granting access to the device. Figure 1 presents an overview of the
devices which were acquirable and had recoverable data pertinent to this study.

Figure 1 Percentage comparison of obtainable information
There is insufficient data to develop definitive trends and draw conclusions.
However, from the sample examined it does appear that individuals and
commercial entities are selling ADSL routers with information that would be
misused if made available to the wrong parties. In three instances it was identified
that the owner had logged into the device and manually removed broadband
authentication credentials.
A depiction of data which appeared more prominent from a security perspective
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has been presented below:
•

Two devices, specifically the D-Link DSL-2730 had its
firmware updated to the latest July, 2010 version. In the worst
instance, one device (Netgear DG834g) was using firmware
from 2006 even though significant updates had been made
available from the manufacturer’s website. The remaining
nineteen devices were utilizing firmware from either 2007 or
2008.

•

Fifteen devices had their broadband service credentials
present. It could be possible that the seller altered or used
fictitious data prior to selling the device. However, in each
instance the username was in the format of
username@isp.com.au or username@isp.net.au and clearly
reflected an Australian based ISP. This was further coupled
with the password associated with the broadband service
which was available in clear text.

•

One device had its device access authentication credentials
strengthened. In this instance the password selected was eleven
characters long and made up of alphanumeric characters. The
remaining devices were using the default usernames and
passwords implemented by the manufacturer.

•

One device had its firewall disabled with specific rule sets deselected. Two of the devices namely the D-Link DSL-200 do
not encompass any firewall blocking feature.

•

Four ADSL routers had the name of a business used as the
SSID which was further validated as a business via the World
Wide Web (WWW). The SSID had a similar name to the
username used as part of the credentials required to access the
broadband service. In addition the business premises clearly
resided in the Australian state the product was sold from.

•

Nine devices had a wireless access point which was enabled.
One device was utilizing WPA security and Media Access
Control (MAC) filtering. Two devices were using WEP. The
remaining six devices had an open connection.

•

The peer-to-peer file sharing protocol BitTorrent was a
common trait amongst eleven devices. This was evident
through the rule sets and ports mimicking torrent clients. Two
devices had Remote Management enabled to a predefined
Internet Protocol (IP) address. Specifically Web and Telnet
were selected.
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•

Two of the business based devices were utilizing Dynamic
Domain Name System (DynDNS). In each instance the user
configuration data consisting of account username and
password were clearly intact and acquirable from the device.

•

Twenty ADSL routers encompassed the network logging and
notification feature. However, none of these devices had any
of these features enabled.

Table 1 depicts an overall summary of the devices utilized in the study, and the
corresponding points of interest that were notable amongst the data that was
analysed. The areas shaded represents devices which did not encompass a
wireless access point and resultantly do not apply to the categories used.

D-Link DSL-2730B
D-Link DSL-2730B
D-Link DSL-G604T
D-Link DSL-G604T
D-Link DSL-G604T
D-Link DSL-G604T
Netgear DG834g
Netgear DG834g
Netgear DG834g

1
2

2

D-Link DSL-504T
D-Link DSL-504T
D-Link DSL-504T
D-Link DSL-502
D-Link DSL-502
D-Link DSL-302
Netgear DG834
Netgear DG834
Netgear DG834
Netgear DG834
2Wire 2071-A

2Wire 2071-A
D-Link DSL-200
D-Link DSL-200
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Network
Logging

Wireless
Access Point
Enabled
Wireless Keys
1-WEP 2WPA

Allow Remote
Management

Firewall
Enabled

Most Recent
Firmware

Make Model

Default Device
Credentials

Broadband
Credentials

Table 1 ADSL Router Information of Interest
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4. DISCUSSION
In 2008, it was identified that the number of second hand disks being securely
wiped was marginally increasing compared to previous years (Valli &
Woodward, 2008). This could be due to the publicity and media coverage
(Moscaritolo, 2010) given to individuals who dispose of magnetic media in an
insecure manner. Furthermore, there is a significant array of commercial and
freely available tools to securely wipe hard disks (Caloyannides, 2009). As a
result, an end-user does have means by which to eliminate confidential data
should they wish to do so.
From a mobile phone perspective, second hand auction sites continue
emphasising to sellers that personal data should be removed from their electronic
device prior to shipping the item (eBay, 2011). This process works as an
education and awareness approach, and in-turn, individuals are at the very least
informed of the possibility of someone obtaining their confidential information.
Similar information and tutorials can be obtained by end-users who search the
Internet as to how to prepare a mobile phone or similar electronic devices prior to
sale and in-turn can follow step-by-step procedures. Tools which can erase data
from hard disks are not compatible with ADSL routers. Subsequently, there are
currently no specifically made tools by which to quickly and easily erase data
securely from ADSL routers. Furthermore, search engines do not currently yield
any supportive information or instruction on the topic.
4.1 User Specific Information
In answering the first question in this study, ADSL routers do contain user
specific information. One of the main results from this investigation is associated
with broadband authentication credentials remaining on the device after a sale.
The value of a password is high in that end-users often recycle passwords for
numerous accounts (Notoatmodjo & Thomborson, 2009) and rarely change their
online passwords (Hart, 2008). This creates two significant issues. Firstly, having
acquired this data, an individual with malicious intent could misuse the broadband
account and its associated features. More importantly, this data can be utilized to
access the broadband account through the respective online portal. Broadband
accounts are usually populated with a wealth of user related information. This
may include the owner’s name, an address, but more crucially direct debit and
credit card information.
In two of the devices obtained, the data shows that the entity previously utilizing
the device was in fact an organisation. This was evident through the SSID which
clearly contained the name of the company. Furthermore, the broadband
authentication credentials (username and password) coincided with SSID.
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4.2 Firmware Currency
The second research question dealt with the currency of the firmware on the
ADSL router. The outdated firmware on many of the devices can be problematic
for end-users. Many ADSL routers can be exploited as a result of vulnerabilities
in the operating system. For instance the first generation Netcomm routers
encompassed an operating system flaw by which an individual who had
administrator privileges could remotely access the device (Baume, 2009; Bridges,
2008). The firmware was severely outdated on all but two of the devices used in
this study.
A potential reason for the lack of firmware updates could be a result of no actual
enforcement to the end-user. On a Microsoft Windows workstation the end-user
may configure how updates are downloaded and installed for the operating
system. The default option being for any available updates to be automatically
downloaded and installed, although the end-user may also disable this entirely
(Gerace & Cavusoglu, 2009). Such a feature is not available on current ADSL
routers. In addition, manufacturers have not implemented a means by which to
inform users that a critical firmware update has been made available.
The issue of ensuring end-users update their firmware can be rectified in a simple
manner. The manufacturer Quality Network Appliance Provider (QNAP)
incorporates a feature within its devices which notifies the end-user when a
firmware update is available. This is achieved via a notification window when the
end-user logs in to configure the device. However, many end-users may follow a
"setup-and-forget" approach meaning there is no reason to access the
configuration options on a regular basis. However, QNAP also developed a
solution for this issue via the QNAP Finder (QNAP, 2011). The QNAP Finder is
a Windows application that allows an end-user to quickly check and apply any
firmware update that becomes available. Similar processes can be applied to
ADSL routers which in-turn would safeguard end-users confidential information,
and prevent the device from being compromised due to existing vulnerabilities.
4.3 ADSL Router Security
Changing the default username and password utilized to access the ADSL router
would seem obvious and a simple security solution. However, an end-user would
need to be informed of the process and aware of the reason of doing so. Malware
such as psyb0t is specifically exploiting devices which utilize default vendor
based usernames and passwords (Baume, 2009; Symantec, 2009).
Based on the results from this study, end-users are failing to make their devices
secure. This may be associated with product literature supplied with ADSL
routers that does not adequately encourage or provide information on how endusers should change the default settings (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009). Based on the
results of this study alone it would appear that vendors must take greater initiative
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to promote and encourage end-users to secure their devices. In-turn consumers
must also be responsible for proactively identifying the available security methods
for their device and applying these when and where appropriate.
Of all security settings present on the devices, it was expected that wireless
networking would at the very minimum incorporate secure protocols. Television
and print media have continued to report on wireless threats and promoted good
wireless security practices (Seymour, 2010; Sinclair, 2010). As a result, it was
anticipated the devices sold would be at the very least use some form of wireless
security with a larger emphasis on WPA which is more secure than WEP
(Lashkari, Mansoor, & Danesh, 2009). This was not the case. Most wireless
access points were utilizing an unprotected open based connection which is
usually the default settings on many ADSL routers.
4.4 Secure Disposal Strategies
Education and awareness of remanent data of electronic media must be addressed.
Deciding who specifically is responsible for informing end-users about security
and proper disposal of data is a separate and debatable issue beyond the scope of
this paper. However, as newer networking devices incorporate a much more
sophisticated array of features then similar issues may arise as are common with
the disposal of hard drives. The D-Link DIR-685 for instance incorporates; a four
port switch, a wireless access point, network attached storage, multimedia sharing
capabilities, printer and media server (D-Link, 2011). In-turn such advanced
functionality will permit different forms of data of interest to be acquired and
subsequently used in a court of law.
A solution to mitigate the issue of end-users disposing of their ADSL router with
confidential data intact would be for the news and media to continually highlight
the security risks of selling of alternative electronic products. The same ongoing
approaches (Moscaritolo, 2010) used to show what is being thrown out on hard
disks and USB drives, could also be applied to ADSL routers thus raising
awareness amongst ignorant end-users.
The second hand auction site eBay could take greater initiative to educate and
make end-users aware of the privacy risks associated with selling electronic
products. Currently eBay provides warnings to end-users whom sell devices such
as mobile phones or computers (eBay, 2011). In these warnings end-users are
instructed to remove personal and confidential information before shipping the
item. However, in 2011, eBay Australia does not provide any warning or
notification about removing private data when listing an ADSL router for sale.
Incorporating clear notifications could prove highly successful. End-users could
be deterred from selling their second hand ADSL router knowing that there is a
possibility that personal data could be extracted.
To date each vendor releases a configuration quick start guide and a detailed
manual. Although neither meets any specific standard (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009)
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it does seem that vendors should be encouraged to release security guides. Briefly
detailing potential attacks and simple solutions may not only make consumers
aware, but could also be utilized to showcase the security features of the device
itself. Further education should be provided to end-users. In the manuals supplied
with the ADSL routers, there is no evidence of the vendors providing details
regarding how to dispose of the device in a secure manner.
Restoring factory default settings is a feature hidden away in configuration or
settings component of ADSL routers. End-users should be further made aware of
the reason and necessity of utilizing this function. Alternatively, end-users may
also undertake a hard restore via the reset/restore switch located on the device.
Unfortunately, this switch is not always accessible with some instances showing
the switch being located within the actual device post disassembly.
5. CONCLUSION
ADSL routers have not yet grown to their full maturity. As consumers continue to
adopt broadband, the demand for greater functionality shall also increase. As
shown in this study, it is evident that end-user do sell their ADSL router, with
plenty of useful information in-tact. As these devices become network media
centres, the interest in the remanent data may also increase. Education and
awareness must be provided and emphasised immediately, to prevent these simple
devices from leaking confidential data into the public realm.
Future studies will specifically analyse a larger sample size over a twelve month
period, incorporating both home and small business based ADSL routers, and the
more high-end multimedia capable devices. This initial study has also identified
potential projects into exploring approaches that could be utilized to educate endusers, install firmware updates autonomously, and applying security which meets
current best practices.
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